George Soros
Economist and Political Philosopher

Friedrich Hayek

Methodological ally turned named adversary — Soros claims Hayek's anti-scientism and prosecutes his market fundamentalism

Friedrich August von Hayek (1899–1992) was an Austrian-born economist and Nobel laureate, the century's most influential defender of the free market. Soros read the Popper–Hayek Economica debate as an LSE student and sided with Hayek's anti-scientism, but spent three decades prosecuting the market fundamentalism Hayek came to personify — most directly in his 2011 Cato Institute lecture 'Why I Agree With (Some of) Friedrich Hayek.'


slug: friedrich-hayek name: Friedrich Hayek role: Economist and Political Philosopher type: person

Friedrich Hayek

Biography

Friedrich August von Hayek (1899–1992) was an Austrian-born economist and political philosopher, Nobel laureate in 1974, and the twentieth century's most influential defender of the free market against central planning. Born in Vienna, he served in the First World War, studied law and political science at the University of Vienna, and came of intellectual age in the same collapsed empire that formed Karl Popper — and, a generation later, George Soros.

Hayek's early work was in monetary theory and the trade cycle, where he crossed swords with the young John Maynard Keynes in the famous 1931–1932 exchange over Prices and Production. In 1931 he moved to the London School of Economics, and it was there, in the pages of the school's journal Economica in the 1940s, that he fought the methodological battle Soros would later read as a student: Hayek's attack on "scientism" — the slavish imitation of Newtonian physics in the social sciences — against Popper's doctrine of the unity of scientific method.

His wartime book The Road to Serfdom (1944) made him famous far beyond economics: the argument that central economic planning leads inexorably to totalitarianism. The Constitution of Liberty (1960) extended the case into a full liberal political philosophy built on spontaneous order — the idea that beneficial institutions emerge from individual action without deliberate design, and that the price system is a mechanism for coordinating dispersed knowledge that no planner could ever gather. Late in life, in Law, Legislation and Liberty and The Fatal Conceit (1988), he sharpened the same theme: the fatal conceit of the age is the belief that man can deliberately design a better order than the one evolved without design.

After the war, as the Cold War hardened, Hayek became the intellectual patron saint of the market revival: co-founder of the Mont Pelerin Society, mentor to the Chicago School's popular ascendancy, and eventually the cited authority of Thatcher and Reagan. It is precisely this late role — the apostle of what Soros calls market fundamentalism — that makes Hayek the one thinker Soros felt compelled to both praise and prosecute in the same breath.

Key Stories

The debate Soros read as a student (1944–1952). Soros encountered Hayek not in a lecture hall but in print, in the great methodological controversy between Popper and Hayek in Economica, the LSE's periodical. The young refugee was a self-declared disciple of Popper — and found himself on Hayek's side. Hayek inveighed against "scientism," the mechanical application of natural-science method to society; Popper defended the unity of method. Soros, already struck by the contradiction between economics' assumption of perfect knowledge and Popper's demonstration that perfect knowledge is unattainable, concluded that economic theory cannot meet the standards of Newtonian physics — which was Hayek's position.

The same premise, the opposite conclusion. The intellectual drama of Soros's engagement with Hayek is that they start from identical ground. Hayek argued that economic agents act on their interpretation of reality rather than reality itself — Soros's fallibility. Hayek recognized that decisions made on imperfect understanding have unintended consequences. But where Hayek used the insight to extol the invisible hand, Soros used it to demonstrate the inherent instability of financial markets. Same premise, diametrically opposed inference: one built the moral case for laissez-faire, the other the case for reflexivity.

The accusation of inconsistency (2011). In April 2011 Soros accepted an invitation to the Cato Institute — the Washington temple of Hayekian thought — and delivered a lecture titled "Why I Agree With (Some of) Friedrich Hayek." His charge was precise: Hayek's inconsistency lies in subordinating his methodological scruples to his political cause. In the Economica articles Hayek attacked scientism; after the war, as communism became the acute threat, he overcame his methodological qualms and became the apostle of market fundamentalism, offering only a mild rebuke to quantitative excess in his Nobel acceptance speech. A theory proving that self-interested market participants assure optimal allocation was, for the anti-communist crusader, too convenient to reject — and, Soros adds, too good to be true.

Hayek in the crisis autopsy (2010). At the INET conference at King's College, Cambridge — the inaugural gathering of the institute Soros founded to rebuild economics after the crash — Soros placed Hayek on the side of the truth-tellers: one of the great thinkers who, in his Nobel Prize speech, kept reminding economists of the importance of uncertainty while the profession's quantitative models designed Knightian uncertainty out of existence. The crash of 2008, in Soros's reading, vindicated the early Hayek against the late one.

Impact on Soros's Work

Hayek's role in Soros's intellectual economy is unlike any other figure in this knowledge base: not mentor (that is Popper), not partner, but the necessary adversary whose best insight Soros claimed and whose worst institutional legacy Soros spent three decades fighting.

  1. Methodological license. Hayek's anti-scientism gave the young Soros cover to break with economics' physics envy. The human uncertainty principle — the foundation of reflexivity — is, in Soros's own genealogy, Hayek's insight carried to the conclusion Hayek refused to reach.

  2. The named enemy. Soros's term "market fundamentalism" names the doctrine built on the efficient market hypothesis and rational expectations — and he repeatedly identifies Hayek as the figure who lent it philosophical authority. The critique of market fundamentalism runs through the CEU lectures, the INET speeches, and two decades of crisis commentary.

  3. A model of intellectual honesty. Soros's Cato lecture performs the very standard it argues for: identify a thinker's inconsistency not to demean him but to improve shared understanding. That Soros delivered the critique at Cato — and acknowledged his own political bias in the same breath — is the reflexive method applied to intellectual combat.

  4. The half-truth doctrine. Soros's mature political diagnosis — that both sides of the state-versus-market dispute hold half the truth and endanger the open society by proclaiming it whole — is framed explicitly as the position Popper and Hayek would share. Hayek thus ends up, against his own followers, drafted into Soros's defense of fallibilist politics.

Key Passages

Key Passages

"Hayek argued that economic agents base their decisions on their interpretation of reality, not on reality — and the two are never the same." — Soros, Cato Institute, 2011 — the premise Soros shares

"Hayek used it to extol the virtues of the invisible hand of the marketplace, which was the unintended consequence of economic agents pursuing their self-interest. I used it to demonstrate the inherent instability of financial markets." — Soros, Cato Institute, 2011 — the fork in the road

"But Hayek subordinated his methodological arguments to his political bias. That is the source of his inconsistency." — Soros, Cato Institute, 2011

"Because he was fighting communism, a scientific theory that proved that market participants pursuing their self-interest assure the optimum allocation of resources was too convenient for him to reject. But it was also too good to be true." — Soros, Cato Institute, 2011

"Hayek inveighed against the mechanical and uncritical application of the quantitative methods of natural science. He called it scientism." — Soros, The General Theory of Reflexivity, CEU, 2009

"Some great thinkers, including Friedrich Hayek in his Nobel Prize speech, kept reminding economists of the importance of uncertainty but advances in quantitative modeling led to the neglect of this Knightian uncertainty." — Soros, INET Conference at King's College, 2010