Senate Commerce Testimony: Energy Market Manipulation

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slug: senate-energy-bubble-2008 year: 2008 title: "Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee: Energy Market Manipulation" source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110shrg80428/html/CHRG-110shrg80428.htm type: testimony

George Soros testifies before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, June 3, 2008, on speculation in the oil market — his most complete oral statement of bubble theory (trend plus misconception, reflexivity, the 1987 portfolio-insurance analogy), the critique of commodity index buying, and margin policy. This page carries his oral statement in full and his Q&A exchanges; the wider hearing record is preserved in KB_raw/george-soros/investment/senate-energy-bubble-2008.txt.

Mr. Soros. Thank you very much----

Senator Cantwell. And, if you could, just turn your microphone on and maybe pull it closer to you so we can capture your----

Mr. Soros. I'm very honored to be invited to testify before your Committee. As I understand it, you are seeking an explanation for the recent sharp rise in the oil futures and in gasoline prices. In particular, you want to know whether this rise constitutes a bubble, and, if it is a bubble, whether better regulation could mitigate the harmful consequences. In trying to answer these questions, I must stress that I'm not an expert in oil markets; I have, however, made a lifelong study of bubbles, so I will briefly outline my theory of bubbles, which is at odds with the conventional wisdom, and then discuss the current situation in the oil market. I shall focus on financial institutions investing in commodity indexes as an asset class, because this is a relatively recent phenomenon and it has become the elephant in the room in the futures market. According to my theory, every bubble has two components: a trend based on reality and a misconception or misinterpretation of that reality, of that trend. Financial markets are usually very good at correcting misconceptions, but occasionally misconceptions can lead to bubbles, because they can reinforce the prevailing trend; and, by doing so, they also reinforce the misconception, until the gap between reality and the market's interpretation of reality becomes unsustainable. The misconception is recognized as a misconception, disillusionment sets in, the trend is reversed. A decline in the value of collaterals provokes margin calls and distressed selling, causes an overshoot in the opposite direction. And the bust tends to be shorter and sharper than the boom that preceded it. Now, this sequence contradicts the prevailing theory of financial markets which is based on the belief that markets are always right and deviations from equilibrium occur in a random manner. The various synthetic financial instruments, like CDOs and CLOs, which have played such an important role in turning the subprime crisis into a much larger financial crisis, have been built on that belief. But, the prevailing theory is wrong. Deviations can be self-reinforcing. We are currently experiencing the bursting of a housing bubble and, at the same time, a rise in oil and other commodities, which has some of the earmarks of a bubble. I believe the two phenomena are connected in what I call a super bubble'' that has evolved over the last quarter of a century. The misconception in that super bubble is that markets tend toward equilibrium and deviations are random. So much for bubbles, in general. With respect to the oil market, I believe there are four major factors at play which mutually reinforce each other: First, the increasing costs of discovering and developing new reserves and the accelerating depletion of existing oil fields as they age. This goes under the rather misleading name of peak oil.'' Second, there is what may be described as a backward- sloping supply curve. As the price of oil rises, oil-producing countries have less incentive to convert their oil reserves underground, which are expected to appreciate in value, into dollar reserves above ground, which are losing their value. In addition, the high price of oil has allowed political regimes which are inefficient and hostile to the West to maintain themselves in power; notably in Iran, Venezuela, and Russia. Oil production in these countries is declining. Third, the countries with the fastest growing demand-- notably, the major oil producers, China and the other Asian exporters--keep domestic energy prices artificially low by providing subsidies; therefore, rising prices don't reduce demand, as they would under normal conditions. Fourth, both the trend for lowering speculation and institutional commodity index buying reinforce the upward pressure on prices. Commodities have become an asset class for institutional investors, and they are increasing allocations to that asset class by following an index buying strategy. Recently, spot prices have risen far above the marginal costs of production and far-out forward contracts have risen much faster than spot prices. Price charts have taken on a parabolic shape which are characteristic of bubbles in the making. So, is this a bubble? The answer is that the bubble is superimposed on an upward trend in oil prices that has a strong foundation in reality. The first three factors I mentioned are real and would persist even if speculation and commodity index buying were eliminated. In discussing the bubble element, I shall focus on institutional buying of commodity indexes as an asset class, because it fits so perfectly my theory about bubbles. Index buying is based on a misconception. Commodity indexes are not a productive use of capital. When the idea was first promoted, there was a rationale for it. Commodity futures were selling at discounts from cash, and institutions could pick up additional returns from this so-called backwardation.'' Financial institutions were indirectly providing capital to producers who sold their products forward in order to finance production. That was a legitimate investment opportunity. But, the field got crowded, and that profit opportunity disappeared. Nevertheless, the asset class continues to attract additional investment, just because it has turned out to be more profitable than other asset classes. It's a classic case of a misconception that is liable to be self-reinforcing in both directions. I find commodity index buying eerily reminiscent of a similar craze for portfolio insurance which led to the stock market crash of 1987. In both cases, the institutions are piling in on one side of the market, and they have sufficient weight to unbalance it. If the trend were reversed and the institutions as a group headed for the exit as they did in 1987, there would be a crash. To be sure, a crash in the oil market is not imminent. The danger currently is in the opposite direction. The rise in oil prices aggravates the prospects for a recession. Only when a recession is well and truly in place is a declining consumption in the developed world likely to outweigh the other factors I have listed. That makes it desirable to discourage commodity index buying while it is still inflating the bubble. There's a strong prima facie case against institutional investors pursuing a commodity index buying strategy. It is intellectually unsound, potentially destabilizing, and distinctly harmful in its economic consequences. When it comes to taking any regulatory measures, however, the case is less clear cut. Regulations may have unintended adverse consequences. For instance, they may push investors further into unregulated markets which are less transparent and offer less protection. But, it may be possible to persuade the institutional investors that they are violating the prudent man's rule by acting as a herd, just as they did in 1987. If not, buying commodities, as distinct from investing in commodity-producing enterprises, should be disqualified as an asset class for ERISA institutions. The various techniques for circumventing speculative position limits should be banned, provided the ban can be made to apply to unregulated, as well as regulated, markets. Now, raising margin requirements would have no effect on commodity index buying strategy of financial institutions, because they use cash. Nevertheless, it would be justified in current circumstances, because it would discourage speculation and speculation can distort prices. Varying margin requirements and minimum reserve requirements are tools that ought to be used more actively to prevent asset bubbles from inflating. This is one of the main lessons to be learned from the recent financial crisis. Finally, dealing with the bubble element should not divert our attention from the interrelated problems of global warming, energy security, and so-called peak oil.'' Although they are beyond the scope of these hearings, these are pressing issues that require urgent attention. I hope my remarks are helpful to your deliberations. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Soros follows:]

Prepared Statement of George Soros, Chairman, Soros Fund Management, LLC Madame Chairperson, distinguished Members, I am honored to be invited to testify before your Committee. As I understand it, you are seeking an explanation for the recent sharp rise in the oil futures market and in gasoline prices. In particular, you want to know whether this rise constitutes a bubble and, if it is a bubble, whether better regulation could mitigate the harmful consequences. In trying to answer these questions, I must stress that I am not an expert in oil markets. I have, however, made a life-long study of bubbles. So I will briefly outline my theory of bubbles--which is at odds with the conventional wisdom--and then discuss the current situation in the oil market. I shall focus on financial institutions investing in commodity indexes as an asset class because this is a relatively recent phenomenon and it has become the elephant in the room'' in the futures market. According to my theory, every bubble has two components: a trend based on reality and a misconception or misinterpretation of that trend. Financial markets are usually very good at correcting misconceptions. But occasionally misconceptions can lead to bubbles because they can reinforce the prevailing trend and by doing so they also reinforce the misconception until the gap between reality and the market's interpretation of reality becomes unsustainable. The misconception is recognized as a misconception, disillusionment sets in, and the trend is reversed. A decline in the value of collaterals provokes margin calls and distress selling causes an overshoot in the opposite direction. The bust tends to be shorter and sharper than the boom that preceded it. This sequence contradicts the prevailing theory of financial markets, which is based on the belief that markets are always right and deviations from equilibrium occur in a random manner. The various synthetic financial instruments like CDOs and CLOs which have played such an important role in turning the subprime crisis into a much larger financial crisis have been built on that belief. But the prevailing theory is wrong. Deviations can be self-reinforcing. We are currently experiencing the bursting of a housing bubble and, at the same time, a rise in oil and other commodities which has some of the earmarks of a bubble. I believe the two phenomena are connected in what I call a super-bubble that has evolved over the last quarter of a century. The misconception in that super-bubble is that markets tend toward equilibrium and deviations are random. So much for bubbles in general. With respect to the oil market in particular, I believe there are four major factors at play which mutually reinforce each other. First, the increasing cost of discovering and developing new reserves and the accelerating depletion of existing oil fields as they age. This goes under the rather misleading name of peak oil''. Second, there is what may be described as a backward-sloping supply curve. As the price of oil rises, oil-producing countries have less incentive to convert their oil reserves underground, which are expected to appreciate in value, into dollar reserves above ground, which are losing their value. In addition, the high price of oil has allowed political regimes, which are inefficient and hostile to the West, to maintain themselves in power, notably Iran, Venezuela and Russia. Oil production in these countries is declining. Third, the countries with the fastest growing demand, notably the major oil producers, and China and other Asian exporters, keep domestic energy prices artificially low by providing subsidies. Therefore rising prices do not reduce demand as they would under normal conditions. Fourth, both trend-following speculation and institutional commodity index buying reinforce the upward pressure on prices. Commodities have become an asset class for institutional investors and they are increasing allocations to that asset class by following an index buying strategy. Recently, spot prices have risen far above the marginal cost of production and far-out, forward contracts have risen much faster than spot prices. Price charts have taken on a parabolic shape which is characteristic of bubbles in the making. So, is this a bubble? The answer is that the bubble is super- imposed on an upward trend in oil prices that has a strong foundation in reality. The first three factors I mentioned are real and would persist even if speculation and commodity index buying were eliminated. In discussing the bubble element I shall focus on institutional buying of commodity indexes as an asset class because it fits so perfectly my theory about bubbles. Index buying is based on a misconception. Commodity indexes are not a productive use of capital. When the idea was first promoted, there was a rationale for it. Commodity futures were selling at discounts from cash and institutions could pick up additional returns from this so-called backwardation.'' Financial institutions were indirectly providing capital to producers who sold their products forward in order to finance production. That was a legitimate investment opportunity. But the field got crowded and that profit opportunity disappeared. Nevertheless, the asset class continues to attract additional investment just because it has turned out to be more profitable than other asset classes. It is a classic case of a misconception that is liable to be self-reinforcing in both directions. I find commodity index buying eerily reminiscent of a similar craze for portfolio insurance which led to the stock market crash of 1987. In both cases, the institutions are piling in on one side of the market and they have sufficient weight to unbalance it. If the trend were reversed and the institutions as a group headed for the exit as they did in 1987 there would be a crash. To be sure a crash in the oil market is not imminent. The danger currently comes from the other direction. The rise in oil prices aggravates the prospects for a recession. Only when a recession is well and truly in place is a decline in consumption in the developed world likely to outweigh the other factors I have listed. That makes it desirable to discourage commodity index trading while it is still inflating the bubble. There is a strong prima facie case against institutional investors pursuing a commodity index buying strategy. It is intellectually unsound, potentially destabilizing and distinctly harmful in its economic consequences. When it comes to taking any regulatory measures, however, the case is less clear cut. Regulations may have unintended, adverse consequences. For instance, they may push investors further into unregulated markets which are less transparent and offer less protection. It may be possible to persuade institutional investors that they are violating the prudent man's rule'' by acting as a herd just as they did in 1987. If not, buying commodities--as distinct from investing in commodity producing enterprises--should be disqualified as an asset class for ERISA institutions. The various techniques for circumventive speculative position limits should be banned, provided the ban can be made to apply to unregulated as well as regulated markets. Raising margin requirements would have no effect on the commodity index buying strategy of financial institutions because they use cash. Nevertheless, it would be justified because it would discourage speculation, and speculation can distort prices. Varying margin requirements and minimum reserve requirements are tools that ought to be used more actively to prevent asset bubbles from inflating. This is one of the main lessons to be learned from the recent financial crisis. Finally, dealing with the bubble element should not divert our attention from the inter-related problems of global warming, energy security and so-called ``peak oil''. Although they are beyond the scope of these hearings, these are pressing issues that require urgent action. I hope my remarks are helpful to your deliberations. Thank you.

Senator Cantwell. Thank you,

Mr. Soros. Now we turn to Professor Greenberger, University of Maryland Law School, former Director of Trading and Markets at the CFTC, and who has worked with the President's Working Group on Financial Markets. Mr. Greenberger, welcome.

[……其他证人陈述略]

Mr. Soros. There is definitely a speculative bubble that is superimposed on fundamental trends in supply and demand. That is not specific to the present moment, because this is in the nature of markets. Markets don't just passively reflect fundamentals. What speculation, or prevailing biases or misconceptions prevail in the market also affect the so-called fundamentals that markets are supposed to reflect. And occasionally they go into this self-reinforcing bubble mode, and I think this is what we are witnessing today in the oil market. But, we have seen it in housing--we see it all the time.

Senator Cantwell. Mr. Ramm, do you have a quick answer to that? Dr. Cooper, do either of you have a quick answer to that?

Mr. Ramm. The quick answer is no.

Mr. Soros. Yes.

Senator Cantwell. You're basically saying that the speculation position, the lack thereof, is causing a great deal of what we're seeing--or could cause a great deal of what we're seeing in this bubble.

Mr. Soros. Whenever you have outside speculators coming into a market on a very large scale, and particularly coming in on one side of that market, in present time on the buying side, they do distort the otherwise prevailing balance between supply and demand. So, the presence of financial speculation can--have some useful service in providing liquidity, but when it gets too big, it can unbalance the market, and that is why there should be limits on speculative positions, and those limits should bear some relationship to the size of the market that you are dealing with. The oil market is very big, but some of the agricultural markets are very small, and speculation can really play havoc.

Senator Cantwell. Mr. Greenberger, do we have speculation limits on all U.S. oil-traded product?

Mr. Greenberger. Absolutely not. We have them on some, but large portions not, because in 2000 this Congress said, ``You can trade outside of regulated exchanges.'' And, because of that Enron loophole, which I believe has not been closed for crude oil, there are no--no speculation limits in these markets that are unregulated. There's a second charade that an exchange located in Atlanta trading U.S.-delivered products is really in the United Kingdom, or Dubai, who's partnered with New York Mercantile----

Mr. Soros. Unfortunately---- Senator Dorgan.--respect to margin---- Mr. Soros.--I'm really not an expert in the oil markets. I said that in my testimony. And so, I really can't express a view. I'm just not familiar enough with oil trading to be able to say.

Senator Dorgan. Dr. Cooper, what do you recommend?

Dr. Cooper. I want to make an observation. I did a report for attorneys general in four Midwestern states--Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and Wisconsin. We looked at the natural gas market, and much of my testimony reflects our early--this was in March of----

Mr. Soros. If I may----

Senator Pryor. Yes,

Mr. Soros.

Mr. Soros. If I may point out that the additions to the index futures buying in the last few years has been a multiple of the additions to the strategic reserves, and that is the-- what I call the elephant in the room.

Senator Pryor. Explain that, if you can, to the Committee.

Mr. Soros. Well, that these institutions, acting as a herd----

Senator Pryor. Right. Mr. Soros.--are accumulating much larger--or setting aside much larger reserves than the strategic reserve is.

Senator Pryor. Right.

Mr. Soros. Now, of course, it's not a physical reserve, and some people argue that, therefore, it doesn't affect the price, but I would differ, because I think it does affect the price. It has the same effect as other buying.